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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ARMY DISCHARGES-"FINAL" DETER-
MINATION BY SECRETARY OF ARMY HELD REVIEWABLE BY COURTS.-
Petitioner received a less-than-honorable discharge before his term
of Army service expired.' The reason given was national security,
although his efficiency and charicter ratings were either "excellent"
or "unknown." 2 After exhausting his administrative remedies he
petitioned the district court for relief, contending that the Secretary
of the Army acted in excess of his statutory powers in basing the dis-
charge on petitioner's pre-induction activities. The statute made the
Secretary's determination final. The court denied relief, asserting
lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court affirmed. On certiorari, the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that it was
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts to construe the statute to
determine whether respondent had exceeded his authority, and that in
this case the Secretary's action was beyond his statutory power.
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress the
power "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation" of the
armed forces.3 Congress has provided that on separation from the
Army, a soldier be given a certificate of discharge in the manner pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Army.4 The Secretary is authorized
to institute boards of review whose decisions as to the proper type of
discharge in each case shall be final, subject only to his review.5 It
is around the meaning of "final" that controversy has centered.
In some congressional enactments, the court has interpreted
"final" to mean the absence of further review, 6 while in others the
1 Harmon was first issued an "undesirable" discharge. While his case was
pending before the court of appeals the character of his discharge was changed
to "general under honorable conditions." Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
2 The alleged derogatory information on which the discharge was based in-
cluded activities in a camp reported to be communist-operated, employment in
an organization reported to be subversive, and registration in the American
Labor Party, cited by the House Committee as being under communist control.
While in the Army, Harmon solicited funds to assist in the defense of two
individuals who had been indicted under the Smith Act. Id. at 616.
3 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
4 10 U.S.C. § 652a (Supp. IV, 1952), now codified as 10 U.S.C. § 3811
(Supp. V, 1958).
S58 STAT. 286 (1944), as amended, 38 U.S.C. §693h (Supp. V, 1958).
6 See, e.g., First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243 (1926), where the stat-
ute provided that the determination of the Secretary of the Interior should
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interpretation given did not preclude judicial review.7 The lower
federal courts in passing on the meaning of "final" in the statute in
question have generally asserted that decisions of the Army were not
susceptible to civil review, either judicial or administrative.8 In
Gentila v. Pace 9 the court based its denial of relief on the finality
provision of the statute, asserting that "the Board's full and 'final'
review should not be subjected to a further review, or series of re-
views, in the courts." 10 In Orloff v. Willoughby 11 it was declared
that the Army was a "specialized community" within our society,
not to be interfered with by the courts. Nordmann v. Woodring 12
considered the problems attendant upon the allowance of review, inti-
mating the heavy burden it would impose on the court structure.
However, the Supreme Court had never decided the precise ques-
tion of the availability and scope of judicial intervention in such cases.
In Patterson v. Lamb 13 the court of appeals asserted that the courts
had jurisdiction to review the action and held that the petitioner was
entitled to an honorable discharge. In reversing on the merits, the
Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on "whether and to what
extent the courts have power to review .. . the type of discharge
certificates issued to soldiers .... 14
With the grant of certiorari in Harmon v. Brucker,'5 the ques-
tion reserved in Patterson came squarely before the Court. Citing
only the Patterson case, the Court assumed the power to review.
be "final and conclusive" of an Indian allotment, the Supreme Court held that
the statute had deprived the lower court of jurisdiction to review. Similarly,
in Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890), a statute provided that ap-
praisals of imported goods should be final and conclusive. The court held the
appraisal final, in the absence of fraud, and upheld the constitutionality of
making an administrative determination final.
I Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Despite the finality pro-
vision of a statute, the Court held that it might review decisions of draft
boards regarding the classification of inductees. The scope of review was lim-
ited, however, to instances when there was no basis of fact for the classifica-
tion. See also Order of Railway Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520 (1947) ;
DAVIs, ADMI IsTRATivE LAW 832 (1951). "Under the Supreme Court deci-
sions, statutory provisions making action 'final' sometimes mean that the action
is judicially reviewable to whatever extent the courts see fit to review." Ibid.
8 See, e.g., Shustack v. Herren, 234 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956), wherein the
court held that the Army has the power to discharge without a hearing and
without a reason, and that the courts cannot properly interfere with that
power; Davis v. Woodring, 111 F2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1940), which held that
the court could not require the War Department to issue discharges contrary
to its established rules. See also Nordmann v. Woodring, 28 F. Supp. 573
(W.D. Okla. 1939); Reid v. United States, 161 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
9 193 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
I Oid. at 927.
11345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
12 28 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1939).
13 154 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
24 Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S. 539, 542 (1947).
15 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
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Then, reaching the merits of the case, it pointed out that the statute 16
providing for the Review Boards expressly requires that their find-
ings shall be based on all available records of the Army relating to
the person requesting such review. The Court held that the word
" 'records,' as used in the statute, means records of military service
and ... the type discharge to be issued is to be determined solely by
the soldier's military record in the Army." 17 Since the Secretary,
who has the statutory power to issue all discharges, had considered
petitioner's pre-induction activities in granting him a less-than-
honorable discharge, he exceeded this statutory power. The Court
concluded that in circumstances where the Secretary of the Army has
exceeded his statutory powers, the courts, as a matter of law, have
the right to review his action and are not precluded by any finality
provision in the statute under which the Secretary acted.
The importance of the Brucker case lies in the fact that judicial
review was granted. The Supreme Court had several obstacles to
overcome in deciding the issue. There were the many lower court
rulings 18 and the fact that Congress, cognizant of these rulings,
never passed remedial legislation. This would seem an indication
that Congress agreed with the decisions.19  Nevertheless, judicial
review was extended. However, the very theory on which it was
granted indicates that its scope is limited to a determination of
whether the Secretary acted in excess of his statutory powers. The
Court did not review an action within the discretionary powers of
the Secretary. Nor did it review findings of fact.20  The Court
granted relief to an unlawful action of the Secretary. Not to a mis-
judgment, but to an exercise of power in excess of the statutory
provisions.
16 58 STAT. 286 (1944), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 693h (Supp. V, 1958).
17 Harmon v. Brucker, supra note 15, at 583.
18 See, e.g., Shustack v. Herren, 234 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1956); Davis v.
Woodring, 111 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See also Nordmann v. Woodring,
23 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Okla. 1939).
10 See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944). The court, overruling previous cases, declared that issuing a policy
of insurance is a transaction of commerce within the meaning of "interstate
commerce." Congress, not in agreement with this decision, enacted legislation
to nullify its effect. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1946). This
power is provided by the Constitution, article III,§ 2: "[T]he supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction as to Law and Fact with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
Thus we see that the silence of Congress, in the face of many judicial
determinations, is an indication of its acquiescence.
20 United States -v. Williams, 278 U.S. 255 (1929). In upholding an ad-
ministrative decision, the court announced that such a decision as to the facts,
"is final, at least unless it be wholly without evidential support or wholly
dependent upon a question of law or clearly arbitrary or capricious." Id.
at 257-58.
1958 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
However, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark,2 1 once
past the issue of jurisdiction to review, poses an interesting question
of statutory interpretation. It is his contention that the act provid-
ing for judicial review based on "all available records" means all the
records of an inductee's life both before and during his service in the
Army; that the Court's limitation of the statute to only the soldier's
military record is "lacking of justification." 22 It is submitted that
Justice Clark's interpretation is more consonant with the wording
of the statute and the probable intent of Congress.
)X
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-FORMAL HEARING AND EVALUATION OF
CONDUCT UNDERLYING APPLICANT'S PREVIOUS CONVICTION HELD
NECESSARY FOR REFUSAL OF BROKER'S LICENSE.-Petitioner was re-
fused a broker's license by the Superintendent of Insurance without
a formal hearing, on the ground that he was not "trustworthy" within
the meaning of that requirement of the Insurance Law. The Super-
intendent's decision was predicated on petitioner's previous convic-
tion for refusing to be inducted into military service after having been
denied classification as a conscientious objector. Petitioner's proceed-
ing under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to obtain an annulment
of the Superintendent's determination was dismissed by the Supreme
Court, Special Term. The Appellate Division affirmed. In reversing
and remitting to the Superintendent of Insurance for further action,
the New York Court of Appeals held that petitioner was entitled to
a formal hearing which might establish a judicially reviewable record.
The Superintendent was instructed to go behind the previous convic-
tion and evaluate petitioner's underlying conduct in determining
whether he met the requirement of the statute. Koster v. Holz
3 N.Y.2d 639, 148 N.E.2d 287, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1958).
When not specified by statute, the requirement of a hearing has
generally been predicated upon an individual's substantive rights
being adversely affected by agency action; 1 where a mere privilege is
denied or revoked no such hearing is required. 2 The requirement of
a hearing has been given special emphasis in regard to the granting
or refusing of a license necessary to engage in certain occupations.3
Statutes prescribing licenses to practice as a physician,4 to prosecute
21 Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 583 (1958).
22 Id. at 585. ,
I DAvis, ADMINISTRATiVE LAw 246-47 (1951).
2 Id. at 250.
3 Id. at 251-54.
4 Gage v. Censors of Eclectic Medical Soc'y, 63 N.H. 92 (1884).
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